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Abstract. Electronic sharing of data among different parties, includ-
ing groups of organizations and/or individuals, while protecting their
legitimate rights on these data, is a key both for business and societal
transactions. However, data sharing clauses are usually specified in legal
documents that are far from being amenable of automated processing
by the electronic platform that should enforce them. Furthermore, dif-
ferent parties usually pursue different interests. This may lead to con-
flicts that need to be solved for the agreements to succeed. Addressing
this problem, in this paper we (i) discuss a proposal for the definition
of a machine processable electronic data sharing multilateral contract
(e-DSA); (ii) recall a controlled natural language (CNL4DSA) developed
for expressing e-DSA clauses, in particular, authorizations and obliga-
tions policies on data; (iii) instantiate a resolution process that can solve
potential conflicts posed by different stakeholders’ clauses, e.g., legal,
organizational, and end-users’ clauses, according to specific criteria. We
illustrate our approach on a realistic e-Health scenario derived from one
described by a Spanish medical institution. The main novelty of this
paper are the reference to the Spanish Data Protection Law (S)DPL as
the basic source of policies regulating data exchange and the idea of a
multi-step e-DSA definition phase that incrementally increases the con-
tract granularity. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first
attempts to investigate how a real DPL can be translated into privacy
rules electronically manageable by a devoted e-DSA-based infrastructure.
Keywords: Electronic data sharing · Multilateral agreements · Data
protection law · Privacy · Conflict resolution · e-Health
1 Introduction
Sharing data among groups of organizations and/or individuals is a key necessity
in modern web-based society and at the very core of business and societal trans-
actions. However, data sharing poses several problems including trust, privacy,
data misuse and/or abuse, and uncontrolled propagation of data. Hence, who
produces the data would like to protect them by imposing some constraints on
the operations that are allowed. Often organizations use legal documents (con-
tracts) to regulate the terms and conditions under which they agree to share data
among themselves. A similar approach can be used when data is shared between
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a user and an organisation. A key problem, in the digital world, is that the con-
straints expressed in such (not digital) contracts remain inaccessible from the
software infrastructure supporting the data sharing and management processes
and, consequently, they cannot be automatically enforced. Instead, they still
need to be interpreted and translated (primarily by humans) into meaningful
technical policies, to ensure degrees of enforcement and auditing. What usually
happens, when end-users data are going to be processed by organisations, is that
end-users are asked to accept online a series of regulatory clauses on the terms
of data processing, by simply clicking on a “Review and Accept the Terms and
Conditions” button, and no further controls are performed on the operations
that are actually executed on such data. Neither the users receive any infor-
mation about how these data are processed or stored. Namely, the processing
remains completely opaque for them.
In the following, we will focus on a multi-step definition process of electronic
Data Sharing Agreements (e-DSA), which can be exploited to electronically rep-
resent (and manage) traditional legal contracts, by properly defining, among
other fields, the parties defining and signing the agreements, the data covered
and the validity time of the agreement. In particular, the different parties will
be entitled to define the privacy policies regulating the sharing of the covered
data. In such a way, the resulting object will contain policies defined by distinct
subjects. The e-DSA will pass a validation phase to check if the various policies
could be in conflict one with each other. Upon validating the e-DSA, it will be
eventually enforced (meaning that the data access requests will be subject to
an access control phase, according to the policies regulating the data access and
defined in the validated e-DSA).
The main novelty of this paper is the reference to the Spanish Data Protec-
tion Law as the basic source of policies regulating data exchange. Starting from
the conceptualisation of the currently applicable law regulating data protection
in Spain, we try to model some of the original clauses in a controlled natural lan-
guage format, amenable for automatic verification. Also, we depict a scenario in
which both medical organisations and patients contribute in defining the e-DSA,
by expressing their own constraints and preferences on the data possibly being
shared. The scenario is realistic too and it derives from a real Spanish med-
ical institution that provided it within the European project CoCo-Cloud [10].
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to investigate
how a real Data Protection Law can be translated into a set of privacy policies
electronically manageable by a devoted e-DSA-based infrastructure. Hence, the
local laws and regulations of the countries in which medical data are produced
and stored impose some specific constraints on them; furthermore, the organi-
zation which produced the data may want to impose its own policies on them,
and, finally, the end-users (e.g., the patients, for the scope of this paper) have
also the right to define their constraints on the data referring to them. Indeed,
the European Directive on Data Protection 95/46/EC, and its recent reform
IP/12/46 of January 25, 2012, embraced by the legislation of different European
countries, recognize the right of the individuals to consciously control the use of
their personal data.
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Last but not least, throughout the paper, we will show how to finalise the
definition of a “conflict-free” e-DSA, by applying an appropriate conflict resolu-
tion strategy to conflicting policies possibly defined by Law, organisations, and
end-users.
The Remainder of the Paper is as Follows: Section 2 reports an informal, yet
quite complete conceptualization of the Spanish Data Protection Law. Section 3
introduces the notion of e-DSA, focusing on e-DSA management over its whole
lifecycle and introducing the controlled natural language we have defined in
the past for expressing the e-DSA privacy policies. In Sect. 4, we give exam-
ples of conflicting scenarios that could realistically arise when more than one
actor define their own preferences over the same dataset. Section 5 presents a
technique for solving conflicts among applicable policies evaluating to different
results (i.e., one allowing data access, the other one denying it). Section 6 exem-
plifies the presented techniques in the healthcare scenario we refer to. Finally,
Sect. 7 discusses related work and Sect. 8 draws some conclusions.
2 Conceptualizing the Spanish Data Protection Law
In this section, we provide a summary of the Spanish Data Protection Law
(SDPL), i.e., Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal
Data, as an illustration of the regulations that affect data in European member
countries, with an emphasis on the regulations explicitly stated on health data
processing. We cover all titles of the law but the title VI that regulates the
creation and organization of the data protection agency, since this information
is not relevant to the purpose of this paper. For the same reason, we skip Chap. 1
of title IV, since it regulates how Spanish public administration should handle
personal data. Figure 1 depicts a conceptual metamodel that captures the main
concepts handled by the law in order to concisely bring them to software and
security engineers.
2.1 Summary of the SDPL
In the first title, the law specifies its subject and scope of application and also
provides a list of general definitions to build the common ground. More con-
cretely, the subject reads
[. . . ] this law is intended to guarantee and protect the public liberties and
fundamental rights of natural persons, and in particular their personal
and family privacy, with regard to the processing of personal data.
Regarding scope, the law applies to personal data recorded on a physical support
which makes them capable of processing, and to any type of subsequent use of
such data all over the Spanish territory. Also, it applies when data are processed
by organizations that are subject to Spanish regulations and that use for the
processing means established in Spain. The law does not apply to data in transit,
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Fig. 1. SDPL conceptual metamodel
i.e., data that do not reside in Spain (neither its processing organization does)
but goes across Spain in their trip to other countries.
The following definitions apply for the purposes of this law, and we have
tried to capture them in Fig. 1.
– Personal data: any information concerning identified or identifiable natural
persons.
– File: any structured set of personal data, whatever the form or method of its
creation, storage, and digital access.
– Processing of data: operations and technical processes, which allow the collec-
tion, recording, storage, adaptation, modification, blocking and cancellation
of data. Also, the assignments of data resulting from communications, consul-
tations, interconnections, and transfers.
– Data controller: natural or legal person, whether public or private, or adminis-
trative body which determines the purpose, content, and use of data processing.
– Data subject: the natural person whom the personal data undergoing the
processing refer to.
– Dissociation procedure: any processing of personal data carried out in such a
way that the information obtained cannot be associated with an identified or
identifiable person.
– Data processor: the natural or legal person, public authority, service or any
other body which alone or jointly with others processes personal data on
behalf of the controller.
– Consent of the data subject: any free, unequivocal, specific, and informed
indication of wishes by which the data subjects consent to the processing of
personal data relating to them.
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– Communication of data: any disclosure of data to a person other than the
data subject.
– Sources accessible to the public: those files which can be consulted by anyone,
which are not subject to restrictive legislation, or which are subject only to
payment of a consultation fee.
More concretely, the law considers public sources the publicity register, tele-
phone directories, and the lists of persons belonging to professional associa-
tions containing only data on the name, title, profession, activity, academic
degree, address, and an indication of their membership to the association.
Also, newspapers, official gazettes, and the media.
Moreover, in Fig. 2 we show how to extend the core conceptual metamodel to
refine it with concepts that clearly affect the access to files, but are not present
in the core definitions of the law, thus are not represented in Fig. 1. For instance,
the law does not apply to domestic files, classified files, and terrorism related
files. Also, a file and a data controller are linked explicitly to a right, which may
turn at run time into a permission to execute operations on a file when certain
authorization rules are met (e.g., explicit consent of processing to receive an
economic assessment) or conditions are met (e.g., for the next 24 h). The last
extension example is the subtype system below the operation meta class that
tries to capture a concept that is more relevant to IT engineers than to lawyers,
i.e., there may be hundreds of operations coming from different systems that
could be classified using this taxonomy.
Principles of Data Protection
In this section, we outline, the principles that should govern personal data man-
agement in any processing environment subject to SDPL.
Quality of Data. Personal data may be collected for processing only if they
are adequate, updated, relevant and not excessive for the legitimate purposes
for which they were obtained. These data shall not be retained longer than
necessary. Processing of the data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes
is considered compatible with other legitimate purposes.
Consent of the Data Subject. Processing of personal data shall require the unam-
biguous consent of the data subject, unless laid down otherwise by law. Excep-
tions are public administrations (PAs) for the exercise of their functions, for
business contracts or its maintenance, in the action of protecting data subject
vital interest or when contained in public sources, unless rights of the data sub-
ject are jeopardized.
Right of Information in the Collection of Data. As we mentioned above, process-
ing of personal data requires unambiguous consent of the data subject. Further-
more, the data subject from whom personal data are requested must previously
be informed explicitly about existence of a file or processing operation, its pur-
pose, the recipients of the information, and the possible consequences of sharing
information, its rights of access, rectification, erasure, and objection.
Definition of Data Sharing Agreements 253
Fig. 2. SDPL extended conceptual metamodel
Data with Special Protection. Nobody may be obliged to state his ideology, reli-
gion, or beliefs. Personal data which reveal the ideology, trade union member-
ship, religion and beliefs may be processed only with the written consent of
the data subject. Exceptions shall be files maintained by political parties, trade
unions, churches, religious confessions, associations, foundations, etc., as regards
the data relating to their associates or members, but the communication of such
data always require prior consent of the data subject. Also in the needed of
medical care, the management of health care services, provided that such data
is used by a health professional subject to professional secrecy.
Data on Health. Public and private health-care institutions and centers, and
their professionals, may process personal data relating to the health of persons
consulting them, in accordance with legislation on health care.
Data Security. The data controller and processor(s) shall adopt the measures
necessary to ensure the security of the personal data and prevent their alteration,
loss, or unauthorized access taking into account the context of handling.
Duty of Secrecy. The controller and processors managing personal data shall be
subject to professional secrecy as regards such data and to the duty to keep
them.
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Communication of Data. Personal data may be communicated to third parties
only for purposes directly related to the legitimate functions of the transferor
and transferee with the prior consent of the data subject, except if the transfer is
authorized by law, done under legal relationships, data come from public sources,
or health data transfer is necessary for resolving an emergency.
Access to Data on Behalf of Third Parties. Access to data by a third party shall
not be considered communication of data when such access is necessary for the
provision of a service to the data controller. This processing shall be regulated
in a contract and expressly laid down that the processor processes the data only
following instructions of the controller, and shall not communicate them. The
contract shall also set out the security measures which the processor is obliged
to implement.
Rights of Persons
Right of Access. The data subject shall have the right to request and obtain
free of charge information on his/her personal data subjected to processing, its
origin and its (intended) communication. The right of access may be exercised
only at intervals of twelve months, unless the data subject can prove a legitimate
interest in the access.
Right of Rectification or Cancellation. The controller is obliged to implement the
right of rectification or cancellation of the data subject within a period of ten
days. Cancellation shall maintain data at the disposal of the public administra-
tions, judges and courts, for the purpose of determining any liability. Afterwards,
they shall be deleted.
If the rectified or canceled data have previously been communicated, the
controller shall also notify the change so as the processor also rectifies or cancels
the data.
Creation. Files in private ownership containing personal data may be created
when it is necessary for the success of the legitimate activity and purpose.
Notification and Entry in the Register. Any person or body creating files of per-
sonal data shall first notify the Data Protection Agency (DPA). The notification
includes the name of the controller, the purpose of the file, its location, the type
of personal data, the security measures (either basic, medium or high level), any
transfers intended (also to third countries). The DPA must be informed of any
changes in the purpose of the computer file, the controller and the address of its
location.
Communication of Transfers of Data. When making the first transfer of data, the
controller must communicate this to the data subjects, indicating the purpose
of the file, the nature of the data transferred and the name and address of the
transferee.
Processing for the Purpose of Publicity and Market Research. Those involved in
publicity, distance selling, market research, etc. shall use personal data when they
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feature in public sources or when they have been provided by the data subjects
themselves or with their consent. In exercising the right of access, data subjects
shall have the right to know the origin of their personal data. Data subjects shall
have the right to ask for stop the processing of their data.
Standard Codes of Conduct. By means of sectorial agreements, administrative
agreements or company decisions, publicly and privately owned controllers and
the organizations to which they belong may draw up standard codes of conduct.
Codes of conduct must be deposited in the General Data Protection Register.
International Movement of Data
General Rule. There may be no temporary or permanent transfers of personal
data to countries which do not provide a level of protection comparable to that
provided by the DPL, which is assessed by DPA.
Derogation. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply where:
– The international transfer is the result of applying agreements to which Spain
is a party.
– The transfer provides international judicial aid.
– The transfer is necessary for medical care or health services management.
– Whereas the transfer of data is related to money.
– The data subject has given consent to the transfer.
– The transfer is necessary for starting or ending a contract or pre-contractual
measures between the data subject and the controller.
– The transfer is necessary for ending a contract, in the interest of the data
subject, between the controller and a third party.
– The transfer is necessary or legally required to safeguard a public interest, e.g.
taxes.
– The transfer is necessary in legal proceedings.
– The transfer takes place at the request of a person with a legitimate inter-
est, from a public register, and the request complies with the purpose of the
register.
– The transfer takes place to a Member State of the European Union or to a
country which the EU has declared to ensure an adequate level of protection.
3 Data Sharing Agreements
An electronicData SharingAgreement (e-DSA) is a human-readable, yetmachine-
processable contract, regulating how organizations and/or individuals share
data. It is essentially a multilateral agreement consisting of:
– Predefined legal background information (which is usually available from a
template, following, e.g., the textual template of traditional legal contracts);
– Dynamically defined information, including the definition of the validity
period, the parties participating in the agreement, the data covered and, most
importantly, the statements that constrain how data can be shared among the
parties (such statements usually include authorization and obligation policies).
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In the following, we illustrate the main phases of what we envisage to be an
e-DSA definition phase, with reference to the sharing of medical data. We imagine
a scenario in which the agreement draft is shown to the patient instantiating
terms of law for the sharing of that kind of data, and the data sharing rules
specific for that health care organization already defined by the policy experts.
In this paper, we propose a three-step phase for e-DSA definition, so that:
– (a) predefined legal background information are already filled and available
in the initial e-DSA template, which encodes terms of Law for the sharing of
personal data. For example, in the case of Spanish legislation, the initial e-DSA
template is already filled with rules regulating the disclosure of personal data,
according to SDPL (see Sect. 2);
– (b) policy experts at the hospital edit the initial e-DSA draft to set rules spe-
cific for that hospital, over covered data, according to internal regulations of
the organization. It is worth noticing that editing the rules at this second step
is not a frequent task, i.e., it is not requested that policy experts write a part
of the e-DSA each time a patient wants to download a document. The policies
internally defined at the organization are static ones and embrace categories
of data, rather than the particular examination a patient may require in the
future, and should be changed rarely over time. At this point of e-DSA defi-
nition, covered data are instantiated as belonging to categories of data (e.g.,
medical reports, payment receipts, administrative data, etc.). Also, we may
envisage that e-DSA also instantiate the purpose for which it is being issued
(like “clinical investigation”, “publicity”, “marketing”, and so on).
– (c) As a third and final step in the editing phase, end-users complete the
e-DSA either accepting or neglecting the previously-defined rules. In particu-
lar, the end-user has the opportunity to (1) give consent to the sharing of data,
as expressed by Law and organizations-specific rules, and (2) edit some other
adjustment to control her data disclosure. At this final point, the e-DSA is
instantiated with the specific identifier of the end-user, and the specific iden-
tifier of the data over which the patient is expressing her sharing preferences.
Given that it is unreasonable to think of end-users (e.g., patients) as policy
experts, opportune authoring wizards should be designed to help the user in
this last phase of e-DSA definition.
Given the three-step authoring phase depicted above, an e-DSA analysis
phase is necessary before actually deploying the e-DSA. During the analysis
phase, appropriate verification tools will detect possible conflicts between (1) in
force law rules encoded in the initial e-DSA template at step (a), (2) organizations-
specific rules, defined by policy experts at organization side at step (b), and
(3) the customization of the end-user expressed in the last phase of e-DSA def-
inition (c). However, distinct priority levels could be assigned to distinct rules.
Hence, if the two conflicting rules have different priority levels, the conflict res-
olution is straightforward.
If the set of rules in the resulting e-DSA are conflict-free, then a deployment
phase follows, where a set of enforceable policies are derived from the e-DSA
and deployed within the organization IT infrastructure. E-DSA enforcement
Definition of Data Sharing Agreements 257
mechanisms are used to ensure that requests to access and process confidential
data happen consistently with the agreed e-DSA, both during the interactions
with specific services and in other contexts, including attempts of employees
and/or other applications to use the data and/or disclose it to third parties.
In the following, the focus is on CNL4DSA, a controlled natural language
specifically designed for expressing and analyzing e-DSA rules. We remind this
language, highlighting its capability to encode some data protection principles
from SPDL.
3.1 CNL4DSA
In order to be able to express e-DSA rules in a processable but, at the same time,
human readable way, work in [23] has introduced a controlled natural language
for electronic DSA, named CNL4DSA.
The CNL4DSA language has been thought to express Authorizations, Prohi-
bitions, and Obligations policies referring to data and involving parties specified
in the e-DSA. It expresses the rules in a way that is pretty understandable by
humans, and, at the same time, it allows to derive a formal specification of the
rules, that is the input for automatic analyzers.
Rules (and set of rules, i.e., policies) are expressed in terms of subject, object
(or resource), action, and environment. Notices that these concepts are inline
with those shown in Fig. 2: Subject, File, Operation, and Context (resp.).
Similarly, the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), the well
known, de facto, standard for access control [27], relies on similar assumptions.
We take advantage of this alignment to be able to enforce CNL clauses (in partic-
ular, SDPL originated clauses) using XACML. Hence, we consider a e-DSA pol-
icy as a set of rules that are evaluated, for each access request, to decide whether
a given subject is allowed to perform a given action on a given resource, in a given
environment. The features of the four elements, i.e., subjects, objects, actions,
and environment, are expressed through attributes in XACML. Although, the
enforcement of metamodel based policies would be probably different in other
settings.
For each element, a (not exhaustive) list of attributes follows, especially refer-
ring to a health care scenario.
Subject. Attributes for subjects can be: ID, Role, and Organization.
– IDs express unique identifiers of the subject, e.g., “abcde123”.
– Role specifies the functions and the capabilities of a subject in an orga-
nization. According to her role, a subject has different access privileges
in a system. For example:
• general practitioner is the role covered by that doctor who has a
general view of the medical history of a patient;
• psychiatrists, orthopedists, radiologists, . . . identify doctors that are
working in different medical specialty;
• rescue team member provides first aids at the incident location and
retrieves the first health information about the patient;
• patient is used when the subject acts as a patient.
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– Organization represents the organization the subject belongs to, e.g.,
“Red Cross” or “Hospital ABC”.
Object. Attributes for objects could be: ID, Issuer, and Category.
– ID is a code that expresses the identifier of the object, e.g., “xyz”.
– Issuer is the ID of the subject who produces that object;
– Category could be medical, including documents that collect medical
information about the patient, and administrative, including documents
collecting personal information, such as the patient’s name, surname,
address, date and place of birth, etc.
Action. We consider their IDs only, e.g., “Process”, “Cancel”, “Rectify”,
“Access”.
To specify authorizations and obligations, we introduce the notion of frag-
ment denoted as f, f1, . . ., and ranged over the set F . The fragment is a tuple
consisting of three elements, f = 〈s, a, o〉, where s is the subject, a is the action,
o is the object, expressing that “the subject s performs the action a on the
object o”. The terms representing the action element a could be instantiated
from a predefined list, e.g., as in the Operation Type enumerated meta-class of
the meta-model represented in Figs. 1 and 2.
Referring to SPDL, examples of fragment could be “health care institutions
process personal data” and “data subjects access their personal data” where
“health care institutions” and “data subjects” are the subject of the fragments,
“process” and “access” are actions and “personal data” represents the object.
Usually, fragments are evaluated within a specific context. In CNL4DSA,
a basic context is a predicate c that characterizes the elements of the policies,
like, e.g., environmental condition. Simple contexts are, e.g., temporal clauses:
“within a period of ten days”, or location clauses: “inside the health care centre”.
In order to describe complex agreements, contexts need to be composable. Hence,
starting from the basic context c, we use the boolean connectors and, or, and
not for describing a composite context C (ranged over the set C) which is defined
inductively as follows:
C := c | C and C | C or C | not c
As attributes of the environment we can consider, e.g.:
– Time, with the obvious meaning;
– Location, which represents a physical position (contextualizing, it could be
either of the object or of the subject);
– Status, which specifies the exceptional nature of a situation, such as an emer-
gency situation.
More complex expressions are generated by combining fragments. We refer
to such expressions as composite fragments, and we denote them as F (ranged
over the set CF). We distinguish two disjoint sets of composite fragments:
authorization/prohibition fragments, denoted by FA and ranged over the set
AUT H, and obligation fragments, denoted by FO and ranged over the set OBL.
Definition of Data Sharing Agreements 259
Authorization/Prohibition Fragment. The syntax of a composite authorization
fragment is inductively defined as follows:
FA := nil | can (cannot) f | FA;FA | if C then FA | after f then FA| (FA)
The intuition for the composite authorization/prohibition fragment is the
following:
– nil can do nothing.
– can (cannot) f is the atomic authorization (prohibition) fragment. Its informal
meaning is the subject s can (cannot) perform the action a on the object o. can
f expresses that f is allowed, but not required. Dually, cannot f expresses
that f is not allowed, hence it is required that f does not happen.
– FA;FA is a list of composite authorization fragments. The list constitutes
the authorization section of the considered e-DSA. Whenever one term of
the list performs a f -transition, then that term evolves to the correspondent
derivative.
– if C then FA expresses the logical implication between a composite context
C and a composite authorization/prohibition fragment: if C holds, then FA
is applied.
– after f then FA represents the temporal sequence of fragments. Informally,
after f has happened, then the composite fragment FA is applied.
Work in [23] also associates a formal semantics to CNL4DSA syntax, based
on a modal transition system MTS [16,17], making the language amenable for
automated processing and analysis, see, e.g., [22].
Example 1. The various clauses presented in Sect. 2 can be encoded in the afore-
mentioned CNL4DSA language. As an example, we consider, from “Principles
of data protection”, the Consent of the data subject paragraph. In particular,
the clauses (1) “Processing of personal data shall require the unambiguous con-
sent of the data subject”, and (2) “Exceptions are PAs for the exercise of their
functions [. . . ] in the action of protecting data subject vital interest or when
contained in public sources” could be expressed in CNL4DSA as follows:
(1) if hasDataCategory(Data, Personal) and if belongsTo(Data, DataSubject)
and if not consentGiven(Data, DataSubject) and if not hasOrganization
(DataProcessor, PA) then DataProcessor cannot process Data.
(2) if hasdatacategory(Data, Personal) and if belongsTo(Data, DataSubject)
and if hasOrganization(DataProcessor, PA) and if hasPurpose(Data-
Processor, Protection) then DataProcessor can process Data.
Obligation Fragment. Similarly to authorisation fragments, the syntax of a com-
posite obligation fragment is inductively defined as follows:
FO := nil | must f | FO;FO | if C then FO | after f then FO| (FO)
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The intuition for the composite obligation fragment is the following:
– nil expresses no obligation.
– must f is the atomic obligation fragment. Its meaning is the subject s must
perform action a on the object o. Thus, the f -transition is required.
– FO;FO represents a list of composite obligation fragments. The list consti-
tutes the obligation section of the considered DSA. Whenever one term of
the list performs a f -transition, then that term evolves to the correspondent
derivative.
– if C then FO expresses the logical implication between a context C and a
composite obligation fragment. It means that if C holds, then FO is required.
– after f then FO represents the temporal sequence of fragments. It means
that after that f is performed, then FO is required.
Example 2. In Sect. 2, we focus on the clauses about “Right of persons”. If we
consider the Right of rectification or cancellation: The controller is obliged to
implement the right of rectification/cancellation of the data subject within a
period of ten days. [. . . ], this can be expressed in CNL4DSA as follows:
if hasRole (User, DataController) and if hasDate (RectifyRequest, Date) and
if timeLessThen (CurrentDate, Date+tenDays) then after DataSubject send
RectifyRequest then User must rectify Data
Quite obviously, if the data subject would like to cancel, the rule is similar.
4 Example Scenario
Here, we concentrate on the health care scenario, giving examples of rules that
could be set through different steps of the e-DSA definition phase. As intro-
duced in Sect. 3, rules definition occurs both statically and dynamically. First,
generic rules are embedded in the initial e-DSA template according to legisla-
tion prescriptions on the protection of personal data. Then, policy experts at the
medical organization set internal rules that are in force at their specific institu-
tion. Such rules will have a finer degree of granularity, with respect to the generic
rules encoding terms of legislation. We may envisage that they will tell about
actions allowed by subject covering roles over categories of data, e.g., “Those
doctors operating at this medical institution can access medical examinations of
patients in care at the same medical institution”. This kind of rules is supposed
to be statically defined, or, at least, we envisage they do not change very fre-
quently over time. A third step, instead, takes place when the end-user (in the
e-health scenario she will often collapse with the “patient”) is going to interact
with the medical institution to, e.g., book a clinical investigation, or negotiate
the terms for a diagnosis collection. We envisage a scenario in which the patient
is asked to accept the terms and regulations of law, as well as the internal rules
previously set by the institution. The patient will also have the possibility to
customize her own preferences regarding, e.g., identifiers of people allowed to
collect the examinations on her stead.
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It is worth noticing that, in the most general case, we envisage an e-DSA
authoring phase in which the degree of granularity increases step after step.
Indeed, when setting the initial e-DSA draft, generic rules regarding legislation
of personal data processing are in place. Then, according to the kind of covered
data, the e-DSA will increase its level of granularity since the policy experts
will speak about, e.g., clinical diagnoses. Also, the agreement will have at this
point one of the parties declared (i.e., the name of the medical organization
which the policy experts belong to), and we may moreover suppose that various
kind of e-DSA exist such that different data sharing purposes are defined. For
example, specific e-DSA templates available at the hospital could be designed
for “clinical investigation” purposes, while others for “marketing and publicity”
or “analytics” purposes.
As a final step, after the patient has given consent to prior rules in the e-DSA
and she has customized particular preferences over one (or more) of her specific
documents, the patient name will be added as the other party of the agreement,
and a validity time will be set up.
Hereafter, we give examples of rules that can be defined within the three-step
e-DSA definition phase.
Scenario: Let us consider a radiology examination report. For the SPDL concep-
tualized in Sect. 2, this kind of document is classified as personal data, since it
naturally contains elements that are useful to identify the data subject. Hence,
the e-DSA associated to this document includes the CNL4DSA clauses imposed
by the law, as for instance, the following one (that is similar to the first clause
presented in previous Sect. 3):
if hasDataCategory (Data, Personal) and if belongsTo (Data, DataSubject) and
if not consentGiven (Data, DataSubject) then DataProcessor cannot retrieve
Data.
This clause states that the subject DataProcessor cannot perform operations
on data whose category is Personal, if the DataSubject does not express her
consent for the operation on such data. It is worth noticing that action process
refers to generic actions that can be performed on a document, e.g., cancel, edit,
transmit, record, etc. (as it was shown in the meta-model of Figs. 1 and 2). Legal
rules are general and are introduced in the e-DSA to safeguard the Law while
managing personal data.
Internal rules at a specific health care organization can be such that doc-
tors who produces the data within the organization can ask a second opinion
from doctors of the same organization, in order to provide a better diagnosis
to the patient (this rule is inspired from a real case study described in [13]).
Hence, in this scenario, the policy experts at the health care organization which
a doctor belongs to may add, at the second level of the e-DSA draft, a rule
stating that “each doctor can read the medical documents produced within the
organization that doctor belongs to”. This rule can be written in CNL4DSA as
follows:
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if hasDataCategory(Data, Medical) and if hasRole(DataProcessor, Doctor) and
if hasOrganization(DataProcessor, Hospital ABC) and if hasIssuer(Data, Hos-
pital ABC) then DataProcessor can retrieve Data.
As a third step, the radiological report is released to the patient. According
to the law, the patient is the DataSubject of the report (that is the Personal
data), thus the patient should give the consent to the rules regulating the man-
agement of that report by the organization. We imagine that the patient agrees
(or disagrees) with the application of such rules by subscribing the e-DSA or
not, e.g., by ticking the consent box.
On the one hand, if the patient does not tick the consent box, when a doc-
tor, belonging to the same health-care organization where the report has been
produced, tries to access such report, both the prohibition rule set by the law
(i.e., “nobody can process the data”) and the rule by the organization (“doc-
tor can process data”) apply. Obviously, such conflict must be solved to obtain
an enforceable access decision. Appropriate techniques for automatically solving
conflicts are described in Sect. 5. Assuming that prohibition rules set by the Law
must be always enforced, in this particular case the conflict resolution strategy
is straightforward, because the prohibition is prioritized during the definition
phase (one could indeed set the maximum priority level for that rule).
On the other hand, if the patient ticks the consent box, the policy set by
the law is not applicable (since the consent has been given). Now, the patient
can express some preferences, likely though a simple authoring interface. These
extra rules refine the access rights she gives on her data. Let us suppose that the
patient gives her consent to access her report (whose ID is, e.g., RadiologicalRe-
portXY ), but she wants to allow one person only (e.g., Doctor Paul Smith) to
access it. Thus, the following rules are automatically added to the e-DSA:
if hasDataID (Data, RadiologyReportXY) and if hasRole (DataProcessor,
Doctor) and if hasID (DataProcessor, Paul Smith) then DataProcessor can
retrieve Data.
if hasDataID (Data, RadiologyReportXY) and if hasRole (DataProcessor,
Doctor) and if not hasID (DataProcessor, Paul Smith) then DataProcessor
cannot retrieve Data.
For the sake of completeness, we recall that, after the third authoring step,
the e-DSA will be finalized with patient name and validity time if no conflicts
arise among all the set of rules defined in the three steps.
Instead, in this particular example, when a doctor who is not Doctor Paul
Smith tries to access the report with ID RadiologicalReportXY, a conflict occurs
between the rule defined by the hospital and the ones of the patient, because the
former allows doctors from that hospital to retrieve the report while the rules of
the patient do not allow its disclosure to other subjects but Doctor Paul Smith.
Next section will introduce a technique for conflict detection and resolution.
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5 Conflict Detection and Resolution
This section describes two approaches to perform, resp., analysis and resolution
of conflicts among a set of policy rules.
5.1 e-DSA Analysis
The analysis process allows to detect conflicts between rules forming a policy.
In particular, it checks if the rules set is conflict-free, by performing pairwise
analysis over all pairs of rules in the e-DSA. The analyzer exhaustively simulates
all the possible access requests, under a set of contextual conditions, defined by
a policy expert (e.g., she can set date and time of the access request, the role of
the subject, the data category, etc.). Thus, the analyzer checks if there exist at
least two rules that, simultaneously, allow and deny the same subject to perform
the same action on the same object, under the given set of contextual conditions.
The analysis tool we have proposed in [24] takes as input CNL4DSA rules.
The formal engine performing the analysis of policies is Maude [5] that is an exe-
cutable programming language that models distributed systems and the actions
within those systems. The choice of using Maude for policy analysis was driven
by the fact that rewrite rules (which Maude build upon) are a natural way to
model the behaviour of distributed systems, and we see a policy exactly as a
process where different subjects may interact with each other, possibly on the
same set of objects. Maude comes with built-in commands allowing to search for
allowed traces, i.e., sequence of actions, of a rule specified in CNL4DSA. These
traces represent the sequences of actions that are authorized, or denied, by the
rule. Also, exploiting the implementation of modal logic over the CNL4DSA
semantics, as done in [6,33] for process algebras such as CCS [25], it is possible
to prove that a modal formula, representing a certain query, is satisfied by the
Maude specification of the rule (or set of rules). The analyzer shows the analysis
results through a user interface deployed as a Web Application. It allows the
user both to query Maude specification and visualize human-readable results.
5.2 e-DSA Conflict Resolution
Here, we describe a methodology introduced in [21] applicable to solve rules’
conflicts. It is based on the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), a well known
multi-criteria decision system [30,31]. AHP is a multi-criteria decision making
technique, which has been largely used in several fields of study. Given a deci-
sion problem, within which different alternatives can be chosen to reach a goal,
AHP returns the most relevant alternative with respect to a set of criteria. The
adoption of AHP to solve conflicts among rules has been described in [18,21].
Within the e-DSA scenario, the technique is applied when the conflicting rules
have been defined with the same priority level.
The AHP approach requires to subdivide a complex problem (i.e., ranking
conflicting rules) into a set of sub-problems, equal in number to the chosen
criteria, and then computes the solution (i.e., choose the applicable rule) by
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properly merging all the local solutions for each sub-problem. In Fig. 3, we show
a possible instantiation of the AHP hierarchy for conflict resolution. The goal
(the box on top of the hierarchy in Fig. 3) is “select the rule” among conflicting
ones, e.g., rule1 and rule2 in the boxes at the bottom of the hierarchy. As usual,
rules are expressed in terms of subject, object, action, and environment and they
are evaluated according to the value of these attributes in order to determine
which rule can be applied to each access request.
We consider as criteria (second group of boxes starting from the top of the
hierarchy) the specificity of the elements that constitute a rule: (i) Specificity
of the subject, in which we evaluate the attributes exploited in the two con-
flicting rules to identify the subject, to determine which of them define a more
specific set of subjects; (ii) Specificity of the object in which we evaluate the
attributes exploited in the two rules to identify the object; (iii) Specificity of
the environment in which we evaluate the attributes to identify the environ-
ment. Furthermore, AHP features the capability to further refine each criterion
in sub-criteria, by considering the attributes that identify each element, e.g., for
the subject: ID, Role, and Organization. The attributes’ set depends on a given
scenario.
Fig. 3. AHP hierarchy for conflict resolution.
Figure 3 represents the hierarchy here considered. However, the methodology
is general enough to allow the insertion of further criteria and sub criteria that
may be helpful to evaluate the alternatives.
Once the hierarchy is built, the method performs pairwise comparison, from
the bottom to the top, in order to compute the relevance, hereafter called local
priority : (i) of each alternatives with respect to each sub-criteria, (ii) of each sub-
criterion with respect to the relative criterion, and finally, (iii) of each criterion
with respect to the goal. Note that, in case of a criterion without sub-criteria,
the local priority of each alternative is computed with respect to the criterion.
Comparisons are made through a scale of numbers typical to AHP (see
Table 1) that indicates how many times an alternative is more relevant than
another.
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Table 1. Fundamental scale for AHP
Intensity Definition Explanation
1 Equal Two elements contribute equally to the objective
3 Moderate One element is slightly more relevant than another
5 Strong One element is strongly more relevant over another
7 Very strong One element is very strongly more relevant over another
9 Extreme One element is extremely more relevant over another
Computation of local priorities. Let the reader suppose that rule1 and rule2 are
two conflicting rules. They become the two alternatives in the hierarchy and
they are evaluated with respect to sub criteria. To this aim, k 2 x 2 pairwise
comparison matrices, where k is the number of sub criteria (in our case, k = 9),
are built according to a very simple approach, based on the presence of the
attributes in the rules. Given that aij is the generic element of one of these
matrices:
– rule1 and rule2 contain (or do not contain) attribute A: then a12 = a21 = 1.
– If only rule1 contains A, than a12 = 9, and a21 = 19 .
– If only rule2 contains A, than a12 = 19 , and a12 = 9.
Once a comparison matrice has been defined, the local priorities can be com-
puted as the normalized eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of
such matrice [29].
Then, moving up in the hierarchy, we quantify how subcriteria are rele-
vant with respect to the correspondent criterion. Hence, we evaluate how the
attributes are relevant to identify the subject, the object and the environment.
In particular, in our example we use the matrices in Table 2, with the local priori-
ties shown in the last column of each matrice. As an example, in the matrice that
compares the subject’s attributes (the left-most one in Table 2), we write a12 = 9
since we think that the subject ID allows to identify the subject extremely better
than the subject role. Indeed, the subject ID exactly identifies one subject. For
the same reason, we put a13 = 9 (ID vs the organization the subject belongs to).
More details are in [21].
We remark that the values in these matrices simply represent the perception
of the authors on the relative relevance of the attributes. Other values could
have been chosen as well.
Finally, we quantify how the three criteria are relevant for achieving the goal
of solving conflicts. Without loss of generality, we hypothesize that all the criteria
equally contribute to meet the goal. In this straightforward case, the pairwise
comparison matrice is a 3× 3 matrice with all the elements equal to 1, and
the local priorities of the criteria with respect to the goal are simply 0.33 each.
Hence, for the computation of the global priorities, pcjg = 0.33, j = 1,. . . ,3 (see
below).
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Table 2. Comparison matrices and local priorities for subcriteria w.r.t. criteria
Computation of global priorities. Once all local priorities are computed, the
following formula computes the global priorities. For the sake of simplicity, we
have in mind a hierarchy tree where the leftmost n1 criteria have a set of sub-
criteria each, while the rightmost n2 criteria have no sub-criteria below them,
and n1 + n2 = n is the number of total criteria.
P aig =
n1∑
w=1
q(w)∑
k=1
pcwg · psc
w
k
cw · paiscwk +
n2∑
j=1
pcjg · paicj (1)
q(w) is the number of sub-criteria for criterion cw, pcwg is the local priority of
criterion cw with respect to the goal g, p
scwk
cw is the local priority of sub-criterion
k with respect to criterion cw, and paiscwk is the local priority of alternative ai
with respect to sub-criterion k of criterion cw. p
scwk
cw and p
ai
scwk
are computed by
following the same procedure of the pairwise comparisons matrices illustrated
above.
It is worth noticing that, in our approach, we do not consider as a decisional
criterion the specificity of the action. This is because we evaluate the action
only according to its ID, always present in a policy. So the evaluation of the
alternative rules with respect to the criterion action is constant, and it does not
add any meaningful information for taking the final decision.
In [18], we have developed a prototype implementation of the conflict solver
based on the rules’ specificity, highlighting a twofold advantage. First, the pro-
totype is specifically based on the XACML engine and it extends the native
XACML combining algorithms for conflict resolution, aiming at a finer granu-
larity in the evaluation of conflicting rules. Secondly, we experienced good results
in terms of execution time, negligible to human beings up to a quite large amount
of conflicting rules (for example, execution time is 275 milliseconds with 64 con-
flicting rules composed by three attributes each).
6 Resolution Strategy Example
We refer to the example scenario in Sect. 4, where a doctor at Hospital ABC
would like to share with another doctor a particular radiological report.
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Let R1 be the hospital rule:
if hasDataCategory(Data, Medical) and if hasRole(DataProcessor, Doctor) and
if hasOrganization(DataProcessor, Hospital ABC) and if hasIssuer(Data, Hos-
pital ABC) then DataProcessor can retrieve Data.
Instead, the patient would like to share that data with Doctor Paul Smith
only (R2):
if hasDataID(Data, RadiologyReportXY) and if hasRole(DataProcessor,
Doctor) and if not hasID(DataProcessor, Paul Smith) then DataProcessor can-
not retrieve Data.
If the doctor at ABC tries to show the radiology examination to a doctor
different from Paul Smith a conflict occurs because both rule1 and rule2 are
applicable, but with opposite effects.
According to what discussed in the previous section, each criterion is stat-
ically evaluated with respect to the goal. We recall that the local priorities of
the uppermost two levels of the AHP hierarchy in Fig. 3 are stitched to the rules
themselves. They are defined according to the scenario when the policies are cre-
ated, and they do not change until the rules change. In our case, we hypothesize
that, for the uppermost level, the local priorities are all equal to 0.33, while the
local priorities for the middle level have been specified in Table 2.
Instead, the local priorities of the lowest level are evaluated at runtime, when
someone tries to access the data. The evaluation is simply based on the presence,
or the absence, of an attribute in the conflicting rules. In our example, we have
that:
– R1 identifies the subject through role and organization, while R2 through role
and ID.
– R1 identifies the object through category and issuer, while R2 through the
object ID.
– Neither R1 nor R2 specifies constraints on the environment.
Table 3 shows an example of the simple 2× 2 matrices that compare R1 and
R2 with respect to the presence of the attribute ID of the element object. Since
R2 specifies the object through the ID, while R1 does not, we give 9 to R2
and 19 to R1.
Similar 2 x 2 matrices are built for evaluating R1 and R2 with respect to
all the sub-criteria (we have 9 matrices). The global priorities are calculated
according to expression 1 and instantiated as in 2:
Table 3. R1 and R2 evaluated w.r.t. the presence of the attribute ID of the object
IDObj R1 R2 p¯IDObj
R1 1
1
9
0.1
R2 9 1 0.9
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PR1g = 0.33 · ((pIDSubj · pR1ID) + (pRoleSubj · pR1Role) + (pOrgSubj · pR1Org))+
0.33 · ((pIDObjObj · pR1IDObj ) + (pIssObj · pR1Iss) + (pCatObj · pR1Cat))+
0.33 · ((pStatEnv · pR1Stat) + (pTimeEnv · pR1Time) + (pLocEnv · pR1Loc))
= 0.34
(2)
where p( )Subj , p
( )
Obj , and p
( )
Env are the value of vectors of local priorities shown
in Fig. 2 (rightmost column of each matrix), while pR1ID, p
R1
Role, . . . are the local
priorities of rule R1 against all the subcriteria, as the result of the nine 2× 2
matrices. For example, pR1IDObj = 0.1, see Table 3. Complementary, for rule R2 we
obtain PR2g = 0.66. Hence, the result of the decision strategy shows a preference
for the execution of rule R2.
7 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the main novelty of this paper is the translation of
a real Data Protection Law, i.e., the Spanish Data Protection Law (SDPL), into
privacy electronically manageable rules by a devoted e-DSA-based infrastruc-
ture. Indeed, this is the first attempt to refer to the SDPL as the basic source of
the design of multi-lateral e-DSA that regulates data exchange among different
entities.
On the other hand, over the last decades, researchers have investigated sev-
eral solutions for (platform-independent) policy-based infrastructures, to spec-
ify, analyze, and deploy privacy, security, and networking policies. Hereafter we
revise some work focused on validation and policy conflict detection and resolu-
tion.
Data protection policy analysis is essential to detect inconsistencies and con-
flicts before the actual enforcement. In [3], it is shown that the Event-B language
(www.event-b.org) can be used to model obliged events. The Rodin platform pro-
vides animation and model checking tool set for analyzing specifications written
in Event-B, thus leading to capability of obligations analysis [2]. The authors of
[26] propose a comprehensive framework for expressing highly complex privacy-
related policies, featuring purposes and obligations. Also, a formal definition
of conflicting permission assignments is given, together with efficient conflict-
checking algorithms and with a set of experimental results which show the per-
formances of such algorithms. The Policy Design Tool [28] offers a sophisticated
way for modeling and analyzing high-level security requirements in a business
context and create security policy templates in a standard format. Hence, there
exists generic formal approaches that could a priori be exploited for the analysis
of some aspects of data protection policies. As an example, the Klaim family of
process calculi [8] provides a high-level model for distributed systems, and, in
particular, exploits a capability-based type system for programming and control-
ling access and usage of resources. Also, work in [12] exploits a static analyzer
for a variant of Klaim.
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Policy conflict detection is generally followed by resolutions of conflicts. Not
necessarily tied to data protection, existing work concerns general conflict reso-
lution methods for access control in various areas. The approach adopted by the
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [27] is a very general one,
defines standard rule-combining algorithms: Deny-Overrides, Permit-Overrides,
First-Applicable, and Only-One-Applicable. As an example, the Deny-Overrides
algorithm states that the result of the policy is Deny if the evaluation of at least
one of the rules returns Deny. A classification of anomalies that may occur among
firewall policies is presented in [1]. In the same work, an editing tool allows a user
to insert, modify, and remove, policy rules in order to avoid anomalies.
In [14], the authors propose a conflict resolution strategy for medical policies,
by presenting a classification of conflicts and suggesting a strategy based on high
level features of the policy as a whole (such as the regency of a policy). If such
characteristics are not sufficient for deciding which policy should be applied, the
default deny approach is applied.
Work in [11] identifies a number of conflict types, using examples from the
military and aerospace domain, and discusses how to prevent and resolve such
conflicts for different classes of them.
In [19,32] the authors deal with both the detection and resolution of conflicts.
Work in [19] defines a policy precedence relationship that takes into account the
following principles: (a) Rules that deny the access have the priority on the
others; (b) Priorities could be explicitly assigned to policy rules by the system
administrators; (c) Higher priority is given to the rule whose distance with the
object it refers to is the lowest, where a specific function should be defined to
measure such distance; and (d) Higher priority is given to the rule that is more
specific according to the domain nesting criteria. In [32], the authors investigate
policy conflict resolution in pervasive environments. They discussed different
strategies for conflict detection but the part dedicated to the conflict resolution
strategy just refers to quite standard strategies, i.e., role hierarchies override and
obligation precedence. Also in [9], four different strategies for solving conflicts
are considered. They distinguish among solving conflicts at compile-time, at run-
time, in a balanced way leaving to run-time only potential conflicts, or in ad-hoc
way accordingly to the particular conflicts. In general they take into account the
role of the requester for deciding which policy wins the conflict. Also in this case,
the strategy is based only on one criterion. The approach in [19,32] is extended
in [20]. Indeed, the authors introduce the definition and employment of the
precedence establishment principals in a context-aware-manner, i.e., according
to the relation among the specificity of the context. The decision criterion is a
unique one that groups a set of contextual conditions.
Work in [4] presents a formal model, based on deontic logic, to detect and,
possibly, solve conflicts among security policies. An implementation of the model
is left as future work. In [7], the authors present Or BAC, a methodology to
manage conflicts occurring among permissions and prohibitions. Within this
approach, rules are grouped according to the organizations that emit them. The
advantage of this proposal is to reduce the problem of redundant policies.
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The procedure known as Break the Glass [15] may be applied in extraordinary
situations, bypassing all the existing applicable rules. As an example, by applying
this methodology, rescue team members can access patient medical documents
in an emergency situation, whatever the policies related to those documents are.
A proper audit support should be used to monitor the accesses.
8 Conclusions
Protecting personal data from unauthorized disclosure to third parties is an issue
regulated by the legislation of different European countries, with the support of
common European directives. Technically, data access, processing, and sharing
can be regulated defining (and enacting) appropriate machine processable data
sharing multilateral contracts, named e-DSA. Based on the protection of data, an
e-DSA is written by all the entities that have a jurisdiction on that data. It col-
lects rules that cover several aspects, from legal constraints to user-preferences.
Hence, in this paper we provided an overview of the incremental construction
phases of an e-DSA. These phases follow the agreement procedure that takes into
account clauses coming from a default template stating the legislation of appli-
cation; the clauses introduced by an organization, e.g., a health-care company,
and finally, the decisions of the end-users with respect to the use of their data
(e.g., including consent, purpose, restrictions, . . . ). As an e-DSA construction
process evolves, the clauses specified in the e-DSA reach a finer granularity. The
main novelty of this paper is the reference and conceptual modelling of the Span-
ish Data Protection Law (S)DPL as the basic source of policies regulating data
exchange. To the best of our knowledge this is also the first attempt of speci-
fying rules of SPDL as clauses for electronic processing in a controlled natural
language (CNL4DSA).
The e-DSA construction procedure is not restricted to the authoring proce-
dure but it also includes a conflict detection and, eventually, resolution phase.
We also introduce an e-DSA validator and illustrate its usage and the conflict
detection and resolution process through a realistic e-Health scenario, based on
a real one described by a Spanish medical institution.
In the immediate future, we will expand our studies about the conceptual-
ization and formal analysis of the SPDL. In particular, we will validate them
using scenarios of data exchange in different settings and domains where they
may be classified at different sensitive levels. In this way, we will also get further
feedback about the practical application of the methodology presented in this
paper.
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